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Most CO2 abatement policies reduce the demand for fossil fuels and therefore their price in 
international markets. If these policies are not global, this price decrease raises emissions in 
countries without CO2 abatement policies, generating “carbon leakage”. On the other hand, 
if the countries which abate CO2 emissions are net fossil fuel importers, they benefit from 
this price decrease, which reduces the abatement cost. In contrast, CO2 capture and storage 
(CCS) does not reduce fossil fuel demand, therefore it generates neither this type of leakage 
nor this negative feedback on abatement costs. We quantify these effects with the global 
hybrid general equilibrium model Imaclim-R and show that they are quantitatively 
important. Indeed, for a given unilateral abatement in OECD countries, leakage is more than 
halved in a scenario with CCS included among the abatement options, compared to a 
scenario prohibiting CCS. We show that the main reason for this difference in leakage is the 
above-mentioned international fossil fuel price feedback. This article does not intend to 
assess the desirability of CCS, which has many other pros and cons. It just identifies a 
consequence of CCS that should be taken into account, together with many others, when 
deciding to what extent CCS should be developed. 
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How CO2 capture and storage can mitigate carbon leakage 
 
Abstract 
Most CO2 abatement policies reduce the demand for fossil fuels and therefore their price in 
international markets. If these policies are not global, this price decrease raises emissions in 
countries without CO2 abatement policies, generating “carbon leakage”. On the other hand, if 
the countries which abate CO2 emissions are net fossil fuel importers, they benefit from this 
price decrease, which reduces the abatement cost. In contrast, CO2 capture and storage (CCS) 
does not reduce fossil fuel demand, therefore it generates neither this type of leakage nor this 
negative feedback on abatement costs. We quantify these effects with the global hybrid 
general equilibrium model Imaclim-R and show that they are quantitatively important. Indeed, 
for a given unilateral abatement in OECD countries, leakage is more than halved in a scenario 
with CCS included among the abatement options, compared to a scenario prohibiting CCS. 
We show that the main reason for this difference in leakage is the above-mentioned 
international fossil fuel price feedback. This article does not intend to assess the desirability of 
CCS, which has many other pros and cons. It just identifies a consequence of CCS that should 
be taken into account, together with many others, when deciding to what extent CCS should 
be developed. 
 
                                                 
1 Contact author. CIRED, 45 bis avenue de la belle Gabrielle, F-94736 Nogent-sur-Marne cedex, France. 
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1. Introduction 
It is unusual – and generally inopportune – to start a paper by explaining what it does not deal 
with. Yet, when an article includes in its title both “CO2 capture and storage” (thereafter CCS) 
and “carbon leakage”, the reader may well think that it is about the risk of CO2 leaking from 
underground reservoirs to the atmosphere. This is not the case here: the carbon leakage we 
deal with is the increase in emissions in foreign countries due a unilateral – or at least non-
global – climate policy (Manne and Rutherford, 1994; Paltsev, 2001; Kuik and Gerlagh, 
2003). What is the connection between this kind of leakage and CCS? The main carbon 
leakage channel (at least in most economic models) is the so-called “international energy 
price channel”, which works as follows. Most CO2 emissions abatement options (energy 
savings, nuclear energy and renewable energies) reduce the demand for fossil fuels, hence 
their price in international markets. If these options are applied in only one part of the world, 
this increases the consumption of fossil fuels, hence emissions, in the rest of the world, 
creating carbon leakage. In contrast, CCS does not reduce the demand for fossil fuels. 
Furthermore, for a given amount of electricity generation, CCS increases fossil fuel 
consumption: in a survey of the technical literature about CCS in electricity generation, Kober 
and Blesl (2010) find an efficiency loss ranging from 3% to 14%, with an average of 8%. 
Therefore, the development of CCS in a part of the world, rather than generating leakage, 
might push the fossil fuel prices up, generating additional abatement in the rest of the world, 
i.e. a negative leakage. Admittedly, since CCS cannot abate all CO2 emissions, a climate 
policy which includes CCS will typically not generate a negative leakage; yet, leakage will 
likely be lower than under a climate policy which does not include CCS. 
This potentially mitigating impact of CCS on leakage has already been mentioned in the 
literature by a few authors (Fölster and Nyström, 2010; Marschinski et al., 2009; Quirion, 
2010a). Yet, to our knowledge, it has never been quantified. This is unfortunate since CCS 
accounts for an important share of abatement in many ambitious climate change mitigation 
scenarios (Fisher and Nakicenovic (eds.), 2007). Moreover, most published estimates of 
carbon leakage, surveyed e.g. by Dröge et al. (2009) or Gerlagh and Kuik (2007) are based on 
models which do not include CCS. These estimates are thus higher than what they would be, 
ceteris paribus, would CCS be included as a CO2 abatement option.  
Moreover, be it in the EU, the US, Japan or Australia, the policy debate about leakage focuses 
on the “competitiveness channel”, which is due to the potential loss in market shares of 
domestic installations, which face a carbon price while their foreign competitors do not. Yet, 
in most economic models, the main carbon leakage channel is not the competitiveness 
channel but the international energy price channel (Gerlagh and Kuik, 2007). This conclusion 
is important since the main policy options adopted or proposed to tackle carbon leakage, like 
output-based allowances (Quirion, 2009) and border adjustments (Monjon and Quirion, 
2010), can only mitigate the competitiveness leakage channel, not the international energy 
price channel. If policy makers are serious and consistent about tackling leakage, they should 3 
 
also consider the international energy price channel and take into account, when choosing the 
technical options mobilised to abate emissions, their impact on leakage.  
In the present paper, we quantify for the first time (at our knowledge) the influence of CCS on 
carbon leakage, using the global hybrid general equilibrium model Imaclim-R. This model 
has been used in several peer-reviewed articles in recent years: cf. Crassous et al. (2006), 
Guivarch et al. (2009, 2010), Hamdi-Cherif et al. (2010), Mathy and Guivarch (2010), 
Rozenberg et al. (2010) and Sassi et al. (2010).  
In this aim, we compare a scenario with CCS to another without CCS. The scenarios are 
intentionally very stylised, in order to highlight the economic mechanisms at stake. Both 
scenarios assume a climate policy in OECD countries only, with the same emission trajectory. 
A price on CO2 emissions, which can be interpreted as a tax or as a cap-and-trade system, is 
calculated so as to fulfil this emission trajectory. It turns out that the scenario without CCS 
entails more than twice as much carbon leakage as the one allowing CCS. We show that this 
difference comes mainly from the above-mentioned international energy price leakage 
channel: when we exogenously set the fossil fuel prices at their business-as-usual level, which 
blocks this leakage channel, then both scenarios entail a similar and much lower leakage. 
This article does not intend to assess the desirability of CCS, which has many other pros and 
cons. It focuses on a so far neglected dimension of CCS that should be taken into account, 
together with many others, when deciding to what extent CCS should be developed. 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. In the second section, we present the scenarios. 
The results of the model with endogenous fossil fuel prices are presented in a third section, 
while section four presents the simulations with exogenous fossil fuel prices, and section five 
concludes. An appendix provides an overview of the model
2. 
 
2. The scenarios 
For two reasons, we voluntarily favour simplicity over realism in the design of the scenarios. 
Firstly, the aim of the paper is to compare contrasted scenarios rather than to assess “realistic” 
climate policies. Secondly, the outcomes of climate negotiations are extremely difficult to 
forecast, so any climate policy scenario for the next decades is very uncertain.  
We analyse two climate policies scenarios (one with CCS and one without CCS) and a 
business-as-usual scenario. In both scenarios, a climate policy is implemented only in OECD 
countries: the EU, the other Western European countries, Turkey, the USA, Canada, Japan, 
South Korea, Australia and New Zealand
3. The climate policy takes the form of a uniform tax 
                                                 
2 More developed descriptions are available in the Electronic Supplementary Material of Rozenberg et al. (2010) 
and in Sassi et al. (2010). 
3 We simulate no climate policy in Mexico and Chile although they are members of the OECD, because they are 
grouped with the rest of Latin America in the model. Also, we assume a climate policy in the entire EU although 4 
 
(or a cap-and-trade system with auctioned emission allowances) on all CO2 emissions from 
fossil fuel combustion, from 2013 onwards. The tax rate trajectory is set in order to match the 
same emission trajectory in both scenarios. OECD emissions peak in 2013 and decrease 
thereafter until the end of the simulations in 2050, year in which they are halved compared to 
2001 (Figure 1). Revenues from taxes on households’ direct emissions are rebated lump-sum 
to households, while revenues from taxes on each sector emissions are rebated to this sector 
as a production subsidy. This is not the least-cost way of using tax revenues, since using them 
to cut pre-existing tax distortions would be wiser (Goulder et al., 1997). However, this would 
require a specific approach in each region of the model and would complicate the scenarios 
and the interpretation of the results. 
Finally, for simplicity, we assume out the climate policies that have already been 























CCS does not apply to diffuse emissions from transport
4 and heating, and is only one option 
mobilised among others (energy savings, renewable and nuclear energies) in our CCS 
scenario. In this scenario, over 2013-2050, 17% of OECD CO2 emissions are captured and 
stored, and CCS accounts for 43% of OECD abatement. These ratios increase progressively 
over the period: CCS starts in 2016 at a very low level and growths steadily so that 34% of 
OECD CO2 emissions are captured and stored in 2050.  
 
                                                                                                                                                         
some new Member States are not yet members of the OECD, since these countries also apply EU climate 
policies. 
4 Except indirectly, since electricity produced in power stations equipped with CCS can be used in electric 
vehicles. 5 
 
3. Quantification of leakage with and without CCS 
As shown in Figure 2, when CCS is available, the CO2 price increases progressively to reach 
$100 around 2025 and stays at this level thereafter
5. At this CO2 price, CCS becomes 
profitable enough to be applied at a large scale, which explains the price stability. Conversely, 
when CCS is prohibited, more costly options have to be applied and the CO2 price reaches 
$500/t CO2 around 2025. From 2025 to 2035 the CO2 price goes down because the old CO2-
intensive capital is progressively replaced by new, less CO2-intensive capital so a lower CO2 






















Figure 3 displays the CO2 emissions in non-OECD countries. In both climate policy 
scenarios, these emissions are higher than in the BAU one, the difference being the absolute 
level of carbon leakage.  
 
                                                 








































































































The leakage-to-reduction ratio, or leakage rate, i.e. the increase in emissions in non-OECD 
countries (compared to the BAU scenario) divided by the emission decrease in OECD 
countries, averaged over 2013-2050, reaches 37% in the no_CCS scenario vs. 16% in the CCS 
scenario. In other words, leakage in the CCS scenario reaches only 44% (16/37)
 6 of its value 
in the no_CCS scenario. 
Although lower than in the CCS scenario, leakage is positive in no_CCS for two reasons. 
Firstly, as mentioned above, even in the CCS scenario CCS accounts for only 43% of OECD 
abatement. The rest of abatement is due to options that reduce fossil fuel consumption, mainly 
energy savings and renewable energies. These abatement options generate leakage through 
the international energy price channel. Secondly, a part of leakage comes from other leakage 
channels, including the competitiveness channel mentioned in the introduction.  
Figure 4 displays the production and price of the three fossil fuels included in the model: coal, 
oil and natural gas. In both climate policy scenarios, coal production and price are lower than 
in BAU, but the difference is larger in no_CCS since the decrease in coal demand from 
OECD countries is higher. The same stands for oil price and production, although the 
difference among scenarios is lower, because more abatement takes place in coal-consuming 
sectors like electricity generation than in oil-consuming sectors like transportation.  
The impact on the gas market is more complex: in the first decades, gas production is boosted 
by climate policies which generate a switch from coal to gas, but as the emission targets 
become more stringent, emissions from the combustion of natural gas have to be abated as 
well, pulling gas production below its BAU level.  
 
                                                 
6 We are allowed to do this simple calculation because abatement in the OECD is by construction the same in 








































































































   
 
We now turn to the issue of abatement cost, approximated by GDP losses. The impact of CCS 
on the cost of emission reductions in OECD countries is not straightforward (Figure 5). 
Obviously, CCS reduces the abatement cost, as is apparent from the significantly lower CO2 
price in the CCS scenario than in the no_CCS one. This explains why the aggregate cost for 
OECD countries, expressed in GDP loss, is significantly higher with no_CCS in the first 
decades. Yet, from 2033 onwards, the cost becomes lower with no_CCS. Moreover, from 
2044 onwards, the cost with no_CCS becomes negative, meaning that GDP exceeds its BAU 
level. Hence, without discounting, the cumulated abatement cost is not very different: 
$65/t CO2 abated in the OECD with CCS, $72/t CO2 without (in US dollars from 2001, cf. 
Table 2, first line). When we compare the cost of the scenarios per tonne of CO2 abated 
worldwide, i.e. when we subtract leakage from the denominator, figures are higher and more 
different: $77/t CO2 abated with CCS vs. $114/t CO2 without. Of course, discounting would 































The first explanation of the relatively low cost of the no_CCS scenario in the last decades is 
that OECD countries benefit from the decrease in fossil fuel prices, decrease which is stronger 
in no_CCS. The climate policy (especially without CCS) generates a rent transfer from fossil 
fuel exporters to fossil fuel importers, which reduces the cost of climate policies in the latter 
countries. The downside of the lower leakage entailed by CCS is that this option also lowers 
the rent transfer from the (mainly non-OECD) fossil fuel exporters to the (mainly OECD) 
importers.  
The second explanation is that, in Imaclim-R, firms and households do not forecast the 
increases in the oil and coal prices that take place in the 2040s in the BAU scenario, increase 
which, for oil, is sharp around the date of the production peak, in 2041. More precisely, in the 
model, when firms and households make their investment decisions they assume that the 
fossil fuel prices will remain constant over the lifetime of the investment. If the fossil fuel 
price increases (which happens in the 2040s, especially in the BAU scenario), the productive 
capital of these firms is, ex post, too fossil-intensive. The CO2 price helps to correct this 
myopia by encouraging economic agents to buy less fossil-intensive capital goods.  
As we have seen, in a general equilibrium model like Imaclim-R, carbon leakage goes 
through various channels. Moreover, since the model is non-linear, these channels are not 
additively separable. Yet, it is possible to assess the importance of some of these mechanisms 




4. Setting exogenous fossil fuel prices in order to explain the difference in leakage 
between the scenarios 
Two reasons explain the significantly higher leakage in the no_CCS scenario. Firstly, as 
explained above, CCS weakens the international energy price leakage channel. Secondly, the 
CO2 price is higher in this scenario, which reinforces the other leakage channels. In particular, 
with a higher CO2 price, OECD CO2-intensive industries lose more market shares, reinforcing 
the competitiveness leakage channel. 
In order to disentangle these effects, in this section, we present simulations performed with 
the same scenarios but with a version of the model modified in order to switch off the 
international energy price leakage channel. In this version, the BAU scenario is ran with the 
same model as in the previous section, but in the other two scenarios, the fossil fuels (coal, oil 
and gas) price trajectories are exogenously set at the same level as in the BAU scenario. 
Therefore we label these scenarios no_CCS_exo and CCS_exo. 
As displayed in Figure 6, the CO2 price is slightly lower than with endogenous prices, because 
in the latter case, the decrease in fossil fuel prices reduces emissions also in OECD countries, 














































































































As shown in Figure 7, emissions in non-OECD countries are now very close to the BAU 
level, meaning that leakage is significantly reduced. Over 2013-2050, the leakage-to-
reduction ratio reaches 7% in CCS_exo and 10% in no_CCS_exo (cf. Table 1, last line). In 
other words, leakage is divided by 2.2 in the CCS_exo scenario and by 3.9 in no_CCS_exo. 
The international energy price channel is thus the dominant leakage channel in our model, 
















Figure 7. CO2 emissions in non-OECD countries 











Since fossil fuel prices are constant in these scenarios, the price elasticity of supply is infinite 
and production is therefore more responsive to a change in OECD demand than in scenarios 
with endogenous prices, in which elasticity has a finite value. Hence, the decrease in coal 
production compared to the BAU scenario is higher (cf. Figure 8). The same stands for oil 
production, although to a lesser extent. Natural gas production is very close to its level with 
endogenous prices, except that in no_CCS_exo, after 2040, production goes back to its BAU 
level instead of falling below it. The explanation is that with endogenous prices, at the end of 
the period, the fall in coal price mitigates the coal-to-gas switch, which does not happen with 






































































































































































































































The abatement cost in OECD countries, measured by the GDP loss, is slightly higher than in 
the scenarios with endogenous prices. As a consequence, so is the cost per tonne abated in the 
OECD, but the cost per tonne abated worldwide (accounting for leakage) is slightly lower (cf. 
Table 2). In other words, the flexibility of the fossil fuel prices reduces the cost per tonne of 






  CCS  no_CCS  CCS  no_CCS 
endogenous prices  77.3  113.7 64.9  71.8
exogenous prices  70.2  93.6 65.0  84.7
 
Conclusion 
We have provided, at our knowledge, the first quantification of the impact of CCS on carbon 
leakage. Assuming a carbon tax (or a cap-and-trade system) only in OECD countries, we have 
compared two scenarios, one allowing and one prohibiting the use of CCS. The former more 
than halves carbon leakage to non-OECD countries, compared to the latter. The main 12 
 
mechanism behind this result is that CCS does not reduce the OECD demand for fossil fuels, 
hence does not reduce international fossil fuel prices (the so-called “international energy price 
leakage channel”). Another, quantitatively less important, mechanism, is that the availability 
of CCS allows reaching a given emission target for a lower CO2 price, which also reduces 
leakage. 
However, this ability of CCS to reduce carbon leakage comes at a cost: OECD countries are 
less able to benefit from the decrease in fossil fuel prices, which mitigates the abatement cost 
in fossil fuel importing countries. 
Obviously, many other factors have to be taken into account when deciding the role CCS 
should play in CO2 abatement. Among these, not least is the other kind of leakage, i.e. the risk 
of CO2 leaching from underground reservoirs. However these other factors have already been 
identified and discussed: cf. the IPCC special report on CCS (Metz et al., 2005) or, most 
recently, Ha-Duong and Chaabane (2010) and Wuppertal Institute (2010). Since a global CO2 
price is unlikely to emerge at least in the next decade, carbon leakage will remained an 
important issue in the policy debate so we believe that fully informed public decisions about 




Appendix: model description 
A.1. General features 
Imaclim-R is a hybrid recursive general equilibrium model of the global economy divided 
into 12 regions and 12 sectors (Table 3) and solved in a yearly time step (Sassi et al. 2010). 
The base year of the model (2001) is built on the GTAP-6 database, which provides a 
balanced Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) of the global economy. The original GTAP-6 
dataset has been modified to (i) aggregate regions and sectors according to the Imaclim-R 
mapping, and (ii) accommodate the 2001 IEA energy balances, in an effort to base Imaclim-R 





























As a general equilibrium model, Imaclim-R provides a consistent macroeconomic framework 
to assess the energy-economy relationship through the clearing of commodity markets. 
Specific efforts have been devoted to building a modelling architecture allowing easy 
incorporation of technological information coming from bottom-up models and experts’ 
judgement within the simulated economic trajectories. The rigorous incorporating of 
information about how final demand and technical systems are transformed by economic 
incentives is allowed by the existence of physical variables that explicitly characterise 
equipments and technologies (e.g. the efficiency of cars, the intensity of production in 
transport, etc.). The economy is then described in both money-metric terms and physical 
quantities, the two dimensions being linked by a price vector. This dual vision of the economy 
is a precondition to guaranteeing that the projected economy is supported by a realistic 
technical background and, conversely, that any projected technical system corresponds to 
realistic economic flows and consistent sets of relative prices.  
The full potential of this dual representation could not be exploited without abandoning the 
use of conventional aggregate production functions like nested CES functions: it is arguably 14 
 
almost impossible to find mathematical functions flexible enough to cover large departures 
from the reference equilibrium and to encompass different scenarios of structural changes 
resulting from the interplay between consumption styles, technologies and localisation 
patterns (Hourcade 1993). In Imaclim-R the absence of formal production functions is 
compensated by a recursive structure that allows a systematic exchange of information 
between:  
•  An annual static equilibrium module with Leontief production functions (fixed 
equipment stocks and intensities of intermediary inputs, especially labour and energy; 
but a flexible utilisation rate). Solving this equilibrium at some year t provides a 
snapshot of the economy: information about relative prices, output levels, physical 
flows and profit rates for each sector and allocation of investments among sectors. 
•  Dynamic modules, including demography, capital dynamics and sector-specific 
reduced forms of technology-rich models, most of which assess the reactions of 
technical systems to the previous static equilibriums. These reactions are then sent 
back to the static module in the form of updated input-output coefficients to calculate 
year (t+1) equilibrium. 
Between two equilibriums, technical choices are fully flexible for new capital only; the input-
output coefficients and labour productivity are modified at the margin, because of fixed 
techniques embodied in existing equipment and resulting from past technical choices. This 
general putty-clay assumption is critical to representing the inertia in technical systems and 
the perverse effect of volatility in economic signals. 
Imaclim-R thus generates economic trajectories by solving successive yearly static 
equilibriums of the economy interlinked by dynamic modules. Within the static equilibrium, 
in each region, the demand for each good derives from household consumption, government 
consumption, investment and intermediate uses from the production sectors. This demand can 
be provided either by domestic production or imports and all goods and services are traded on 
international markets. Domestic and international markets for all goods – excluding labour – 
are cleared by a unique set of relative prices that depend on the demand and supply 
behaviours of representative agents. The calculation of this equilibrium determines relative 
prices, wages, labour, quantities of goods and services, and value flows.  
The dynamic modules shape the accumulation of capital and its technical content, they are 
driven by economic signals (such as prices or sectoral profitability) that emerge from former 
static equilibriums. They include the modelling of (i) the evolution of capital and energy 
equipment stock described in both vintage and physical units (such as number of cars, housing 
square meter, transportation infrastructure), (ii) of technological choices of economic agent 
described as discrete choices in explicit technology portfolios for key sectors such as 
electricity, transportation and alternative liquid fuels, or captured through reduced form of 
technology rich bottom up models, and (iii) of endogenous technical change for energy 
technologies (with learning curves). 15 
 
In this framework, the main exogenous drivers of economic growth are population and labour 
productivity dynamics. However, international trade, particularly that of energy commodities, 
and imperfect markets for both labour (wage curve) and capital (constrained capital flows, 
varying utilisation rates of productive capacities), significantly impact on economic growth.  
 
A.2. Energy markets and CCS in the Imaclim-R model 
A.2.1. Oil  
Oil markets are described in detail in Waisman et al. (2010). In particular, oil prices are 
related to the utilization rate of oil production capacity (Kauffmann et al., 2004), which in 
turn depends on the dynamics of both the supply and the demand side. 
The main objective of the oil production module is to capture the drivers of short term 
scarcity generated by gaps between demand and production which cannot be bridged 
overnight given technical and economic inertia. Imaclim-R describes these determinants with 
a high level of site specific details that include the amount of ultimate resources, cost profiles 
of oil fields and the constraints on the deployment of production capacities.  
To describe those deployment constraints, regional oil resources are distinguished according 
to their cost of exploration and exploitation. Once the decision to initiate investments in a 
given oil category is made, the pace of deployment of production capacities is determined by 
inertias affecting the efficiency of exploration
7. In line with Rehrl and Friedrich (2006), we 
adopt the following dynamic equation to describe the deployment of production capacities 
Cap for a given category: 


















This analytical expression corresponds to a bell-shaped symmetric Hubbert curve (Hubbert, 
1962) differentiated across oil categories by its steepness and the area it delimits. The former 
characteristic measures the intensity of the constraints slowing down discoveries and is 
captured by parameter b (b=0.061). The latter one accounts for the amount of ultimate 
reserves through parameterQ∞  (=3.6Tb in these scenarios).  
At a given point in time, oil production capacity thus depends upon two parameters, the 
previous decision to initiate exploration and the Hubbert curve that determines the geological 
constraints affecting the exploration process. In Imaclim-R, the utilization rate of those 
production capacities captures the level of tensions between supply and demand and affects 
the profit margin on any product: the higher the utilization rate, the higher the scarcity rent 
captured through a higher mark-up rate.  
                                                 
7 We assume a constant time-lag between discovery and production capacity 16 
 
Contrary to most sectors for which high unitary profit margin triggers investment decisions, 
Middle-East oil producers have the latitude to refrain from investing, hence creating tensions 
through an overutilization of their producing capacity, in order to better fulfill long term 
objectives. This ‘swing producer’ behavior is coherent with past OPEC production which has 
no longer fit the discovery trend since the 1970s oil shocks. In our scenarios, OPEC aims at a 
short-term price of $80/bl. As for non-Middle-East producers (that are ‘fatal producers’), they 
cannot but act as followers: they observe the current oil prices, and decide to launch 
exploration campaigns of a category of oil as soon as it becomes profitable. 
A.2.2. Gas 
In the model, global gas production capacities answer to demand growth until ultimately 
recoverable resources enter a depletion process. Gas prices variations are indexed on that of 
oil prices via an indexation coefficient (0.68, see equation below) calibrated on the World 
Energy Model of the IEA (2007). When oil prices increase by 1%, gas prices increase by 
0.68%. This indexation disappears when oil prices reach $80/bl.: beyond this threshold, the 
evolution of gas prices only depends on production costs and possibly on the depletion effect, 
which leads to a sharp price increase (due to an augmentation of the producer mark-up rate). 
Gas price in each region at year t is equal to:  
() ()
ref
gas gas gas tt pp τ =⋅  
where: 
ref
gas p  is the gas price in this region at year 1. 
While gas depletion has not started,  () gas t τ  in each region is:  
12 1
( ) 0.68 ( ) ( 1)
33
gas oil oil ref
oil
tw p t w p t
wp




() oil wp t is the international oil price at year t; 
ref
oil wp is the international oil price at year 1. 
Moreover, if depletion has started in this region,  () gas t τ  increases by 5% each year, regardless 
of oil prices. 
A.2.3. Coal 
Coal is treated in a different way than oil and gas because of the larger amount of available 
resources which prevents coal production from entering into a depletion process before the 
end of the 21
st century. We describe price formation on the international coal market with a 
reduced functional form which relates price variation to production changes. This choice 
allows us to capture the cyclic behavior of this commodity market. In these scenarios, coal 17 
 
price growth sensitivity with respect to coal production growth is quite high, so that the coal 
production growth cannot be absorbed without prices variations. 
Coal price in  year t is equal to:  
() ()
ref
coal coal coal tp p t τ ⋅ =  
Where  () ()
ref
coal coal coal tp p t τ ⋅ =  
ref
coal p  is the coal price in this region at year 1. 
() coal t τ is defined as  
() ( 1 ) () ) (1 coal coal i coal t tt g τ τα =− ⋅ + ⋅  
with  lim
















g =  
Where  ()
world
coal Qt is the international coal production at year t. 
lim g  is the production growth rate that would not lead to price fluctuation (we set it to 0.05%). 
We distinguish upwards and downwards movements of production growth, in order to 
introduce asymmetry in price response: we use  1 α (=1) as the price growth elasticity to 
production decrease when production growth is lower than  lim g and  2 α  (=4) when production 
growth is greater than lim g . 
1.4. Carbon capture and storage 
The CCS technology is represented in the electricity sector and Coal-To-Liquid production 
(see 1.5 below). The electricity supply module in Imaclim-R represents the evolution of 
power generation capacities over time, which depends on the amount of capital available for 
new investments and changes in fuel and factor prices. The model anticipates ten years 
forward the potential future electricity demand, taking into account past trends of demand, 
and computes an optimal mix of electricity productive capacities to face future needs at the 
lowest cost, expecting that fuel prices will stay at their current level. Three technologies can 
incorporate a CCS device: Combine Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT), Supercritical coal plant, and 
Integrated coal Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC). Each technology is characterized by a 
date of availability across each region, a level of energy efficiency, a capital cost when 
arriving to the market, a technology learning rate, and maximum socially and technically 
achievable market shares. 
1.5. Biofuel and Coal-To-Liquid (CTL) 
In our numerical exercises with the Imaclim-R modeling framework, biofuels (first and 
second generation) and Coal-To-Liquid fuels represent the main alternatives to refined oil 
over the 21
st century.  18 
 
Biofuels: The penetration of biofuels in energy supply is modeled according to worldwide 
supply curves published by the IEA (2006). They have been interpolated to integrate an 
annual continuum of the curves between 2001 and 2100 into the Imaclim-R model. 
Production potentials increase with time simultaneously with cost reductions thanks to 
constant technical progress. These production potential increases are mainly due to maturing, 
at middle term, of so-called second-generation technologies: the cellulosic-lignite branch for 
ethanol and the biomass liquefaction branch for biodiesel. The penetration of biofuels on the 
liquid fuels market depends on their competitiveness and availability. Both aspects are 
calculated by equaling out the marginal production costs of each type of biofuel and the price 
of fuel produced by the “classical” branch of refined crude oil, with an eventual increase due 
to a carbon tax in the case of climate policies. 
Coal-To-Liquid (CTL): As soon as oil prices exceed a threshold value pCTL
8,
 CTL producers 
are willing to fill the gap between total liquid fuel demand D(t) and the total supply by other 
sources (refined oil and biofuels) S(t).
 Their production objective is then D(t)-S(t). But they 
may miss this objective because of insufficient delivery capacity at a given point in time as a 
result of past under-investments. Indeed, under imperfect foresight, a period of low oil prices 
affects the profitability prospects of CTL and suggests postponing the investments in this 
technology: CTL investments are driven by the current level of oil price at each date, and 












The share s of the targeted CTL production that is actually realized given the constraints on 
production investments is an increasing function of cumulative investments and, hence, of 
() cum p t . As soon as oil price exceeds pCTL , CTL production is then given by:  
() ( )[ ] (). () S () cum CTL t s p t D t t =−                                            
A share of CO2 emissions due to CTL production can be sequestrated, as a growing function 
of the carbon tax.  
 
                                                 
8 We take pCTL= $100/Bbl for all scenarios 19 
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